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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-2440
____________
IN RE:  EDUCATIONAL ASSIGNMENT OF JOSEPH R.,
a Student in the Mars Area School District
J.R. and K.R., parents and next friend of J.R.,
               Appellants
____________
No. 07-2753
____________
J.R. and K.R., parents and next friend of J.R.,
               Appellants
         v.
MARS AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Nos. 04-cv-00026, 03-cv-00972 and 03-cv-01802)
District Judge:  Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 9, 2009
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 24, 2009)
2____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
These consolidated appeals arise from administrative proceedings and subsequent
litigation concerning the provision of special education services by the Mars Area School
District to J.R., a learning disabled child covered by the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.  In the case at Docket No. 07-2440,
J.R.’s parents appeal from the District Court’s May 4, 2007 judgment in favor of the
School District, challenging the District Court’s conclusion that the School District did
not violate the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).  In the related case at
Docket No. 07-2753, the parents appeal from an order entered by the District Court on
June 5, 2007, in which the District Court denied their motion for prevailing party
attorney’s fees in that case.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court
in both instances.
I.  BACKGROUND
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
3A.  No. 07-2440
In late 2003, when the dispute underlying the appeal at No. 07-2440 arose, J.R.
was a fifth-grade student at Adams Elementary School in the Mars Area School District. 
J.R. had previously been identified by the School District as a student with a “specific
learning disability” and, as such, the School District was required under the IDEA to
develop an individualized education program (IEP) for him and to review it once a year. 
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2), (4); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (discussing 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)).  In May 2001 the School District and J.R.’s parents agreed upon an
IEP to govern J.R.’s education during the 2001-2002 school year, his third-grade year. 
Under that IEP, J.R. spent most of his school day in a regular classroom but also received
learning support for approximately one hour a day in a resource room.  The 2001-2002
IEP was not intended to serve J.R. beyond his third-grade year, but it was the last IEP to
which J.R.’s parents and the School District were able to agree, despite having met
numerous times to discuss various program proposals for the subsequent 2002-2003 and
2003-2004 school years.
On August 6, 2003, the School District presented yet another proposed IEP to
J.R.’s parents, which it detailed in a Notice of Recommended Educational Placement
(NOREP).  That proposed IEP was intended for J.R.’s 2003-2004 school year, and among
its many provisions was a recommendation that, going forward, he receive “itinerant”
learning support, i.e., learning support provided primarily in the regular classroom, in
In the version of the Pennsylvania Code in effect during the time period relevant1
to this appeal, “itinerant” learning support is defined as “[r]egular classroom instruction
for most of the school day, with special education services and programs provided by
special education personnel inside or outside of the regular class for part of the school
day.”  22 Pa. Code § 14.141 (2003).
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place of the daily hour of resource room support specified in his 2001-2002 IEP.   A few1
days later, on August 11, 2003, the School District sent a form letter to J.R.’s parents
informing them that it would offer inclusion classes to all of its elementary students,
including J.R., starting in the 2003-2004 school year.  After receiving both of these
documents, J.R.’s parents, apparently displeased with the prospect that J.R.’s learning
support services would be provided in an inclusion classroom instead of in a resource
room, decided not to approve the NOREP, returning it unsigned to the School District. 
Instead, they requested a due process hearing to assess two related issues:  (1) whether the
School District had denied J.R. a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by failing to
implement a mutually agreed upon IEP for the 2003-2004 school year and (2) whether the
School District’s decision to provide learning support services to J.R. in an inclusion
classroom instead of in a resource room amounted to a change in his educational
placement.
At the due process hearing, the hearing officer heard the testimony of three
witnesses for the School District – J.R.’s fifth-grade teacher, his special education
teacher, and the district-wide director of special education – and one witness for J.R. – his
mother.  The School District’s witnesses testified that J.R. continued to receive in the
During the time period relevant to this case, Pennsylvania had a two-tiered2
administrative system of review in IDEA cases, in which the initial hearing took place
before a hearing officer at the local educational agency level followed by an independent
review of the hearing officer’s decision by an appeals panel at the state educational
agency level.  See 22 Pa. Code § 14.162(d), (o) (2003); cf. Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P.,
62 F.3d 520, 526-27 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing Pennsylvania’s two-tiered system). 
Pennsylvania subsequently amended its administrative procedures to allow a hearing
officer’s decision to be appealed directly to a court of competent jurisdiction.  See 22 Pa.
Code § 14.162(o) (2008).  That amendment took effect on July 1, 2008, and does not
apply to this case.
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inclusion classroom all the services specified in his 2001-2002 IEP, that he was making
academic progress in the inclusion classroom, and that he was passing all of his subjects. 
J.R.’s mother, for her part, testified that she did not know, nor had she been informed of,
the amount of time J.R. was spending with a special education teacher each day in the
inclusion classroom.
After considering this testimony and the other evidence presented by the parties,
the hearing officer held that the School District had neither deprived J.R. of a FAPE nor
unilaterally changed his educational placement, concluding that “[t]here was no evidence
presented or testimony that stated [J.R.] was not receiving the needed special education
services.”  J.R.’s parents administratively appealed  and the state appeals panel reversed2
the hearing officer’s decision in part, holding that “the [School] District’s automatic
decision to educate [J.R.] in an inclusion classroom . . . constituted a unilateral
placement” and ordering the School District to provide J.R. with one hour of
Although the appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer’s decision that the School3
District had not denied J.R. a FAPE by failing to implement a mutually agreed upon IEP
for the 2003-2004 school year, J.R.’s parents abandoned their challenge to this aspect of
the administrative decision in the District Court, and we do not address it here.
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compensatory education in learning services for each school day he attended during the
2003-2004 school year.
The School District then brought this action challenging the appeals panel’s
decision.  After reviewing the administrative record, the District Court entered judgment
in favor of the School District on May 4, 2007, concluding that J.R.’s parents had not
demonstrated that the School District’s unilateral relocation of J.R. to an inclusion
classroom constituted a change in his educational placement.   On May 10, 2007, J.R.’s3
parents filed a notice of appeal from that judgment, which the Clerk of the Court
docketed at No. 07-2440.
B.  No. 07-2753
The appeal at No. 07-2753 arises from an earlier due process proceeding initiated
by J.R.’s parents to determine whether the School District had denied J.R. a FAPE during
his third- and fourth-grade years.  The hearing officer in that proceeding held that the
School District had denied J.R. a FAPE during those school years and ordered it to
provide J.R. with 283.5 hours of compensatory education, which an appeals panel
subsequently increased to 306.5 hours.  The parties eventually settled the matter during a
pretrial conference before the District Court and, although the School District agreed in
7the settlement to provide J.R. with nothing more than the 306.5 hours of compensatory
education ordered by the appeals panel, J.R.’s parents filed a motion seeking prevailing
party attorney’s fees.
In an order dated May 4, 2007, the District Court determined “categorically” that
J.R.’s parents could not be considered prevailing parties for purposes of the federal action
because they “occup[ied] precisely the same legal position [as a result of the settlement]
which they were in immediately following the decision of the Appeals Panel in 2003,”
having “achieved absolutely nothing more than had been awarded by the Appeals Panel.” 
They could, however, be considered prevailing parties at the state administrative level, the
District Court concluded, because of their success with respect to certain issues raised in
that forum, and thus were eligible to recover reasonable attorney’s fees “specifically
related to that success throughout the administrative proceedings.”
But the District Court, that conclusion notwithstanding, was unable to determine
the amount of attorney’s fees to which J.R.’s parents were entitled because the “extremely
generic and vague” supporting documentation submitted by their attorney, Eugene A.
Lincoln, Esq., fell “far short of providing sufficient detail to permit the Court to
determine whether each claimed legal activity was related to the specific issues on which
[the parents] prevailed.”  Rather than simply deny altogether the parents’ motion for fees,
however, the District Court “held in abeyance” the question of their right to attorney’s
fees “incurred in the administrative process” and instead directed Mr. Lincoln “to submit
8a revised fee petition [containing] sufficient detail to enable the Court to evaluate the
relationship between counsel’s legal actions and the issue(s) on which [J.R.’s parents]
prevailed at the administrative level.”  Mr. Lincoln did not submit a revised petition,
however, and the District Court ultimately denied the parents’ petition in full in an order
dated June 5, 2007, concluding that they had not met their burden to submit sufficient
evidence “to demonstrate which legal services are compensable for the . . . issues on
which they prevailed” at the administrative level.  The parents filed a notice of appeal
from that order on June 11, 2007, which the Clerk docketed at No. 07-2753 and
consolidated with No. 07-2440.
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
A district court must review an IDEA decision by a state administrative agency
under a modified de novo standard.  L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d
Cir. 2006).  Under this unusual standard, a district court must afford “due weight” to the
factual findings from the administrative proceedings, considering those findings to be
“prima facie correct.”  See id.; Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194,
199 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982); Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 524 (3d Cir. 1995)
(“The district court may reach an independent decision, except that it must accord the
9decision of the state agency ‘due weight’ in its consideration.”).  At the same time, the
district court must “hear additional evidence at the request of a party,” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii), and must also “make its own findings by a preponderance of the
evidence.”  Shore Reg’l, 381 F.3d at 199; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).  But “where
the District Court does not hear additional evidence it must find support for any factual
conclusions contrary to [those of the administrative agency] in the record before it.”  S.H.
v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003).  In contrast, the
“due weight” to be afforded to the administrative proceedings is “not implicated with
respect to issues of law, such as the proper interpretation of the [IDEA] and its
requirements”; that is, the district court owes no deference to conclusions of law drawn
by a state or local educational agency.  Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ.,
397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005); see Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist.
#221, 375 F.3d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 2004); cf. Carlisle Area Sch., 62 F.3d at 528 n.3
(“Obviously, conclusions of law receive plenary review.”).
We, in turn, “‘exercise plenary review with respect to the question whether the
District Court applied the correct legal standards under the IDEA, but we review the
District Court’s factual findings for clear error.’”  Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d at 389
(quoting Shore Reg’l, 381 F.3d at 199); see Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266
(3d Cir. 2007); Carlisle Area Sch., 62 F.3d at 526.  “‘A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when, after reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals is left with a definite
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and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”  Shore Reg’l, 381 F.3d at 199
(quoting Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir.
1993)).
We review a district court’s denial of attorney’s fees under the IDEA’s fee-shifting
provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), under an abuse of discretion standard.  Pardini v.
Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 422 (3d Cir. 2008) (Pardini II); P.N. v.
Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006).  A district court abuses its
discretion when it rests its decision “‘upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’”  Pardini II, 524 F.3d at 422
(quoting Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d at 852); see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d
1177, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1990) (“An abuse of discretion can occur when no reasonable
person would adopt the district court’s view.  Whether the district court applied the
proper standards or procedures is a question of law subject to plenary review.  The district
court’s factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.”) (citations
omitted).
III.  DISCUSSION
A.  Change in Educational Placement
The principal question in the appeal at No. 07-2440 is whether the District Court
erred in concluding that the School District’s unilateral relocation of J.R. out of the
resource room and into an inclusion classroom during the pendency of proceedings
11
amounts to a change in his educational placement within the meaning of the IDEA’s
“stay-put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).  Section 1415(j) provides, in relevant part, that
“during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the
State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain
in the then-current educational placement of the child . . . until all such proceedings have
been completed.”  The Supreme Court has explained that the main purpose of the stay-put
provision is “to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to
exclude disabled students . . . from school.”  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988).
The IDEA does not define the term “educational placement” and thus “identifying
a change in this placement is something of an inexact science.”  Bd. of Educ. of Cmty.
High Sch. Dist. No. 218 v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 1996). 
Nonetheless, our precedent provides some guidance in this regard.  In DeLeon v.
Susquehanna Community School District, 747 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1984), a case relied on
heavily by the District Court, we discussed our understanding of what constitutes a
“change in educational placement” in the context of a predecessor statute to the IDEA. 
As we explained in that case, “[t]he question of what constitutes a change in educational
placement is, necessarily, fact specific” and thus, “in determining whether a given
modification in a child’s school day should be considered a ‘change in educational
placement,’” the “touchstone” is whether the modification “is likely to affect in some
significant way the child’s learning experience.”  Id. at 153.
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Here, the District Court properly focused its inquiry on whether the move to an
inclusion classroom was likely to significantly affect J.R.’s ability to learn.  Reviewing
the administrative record, the District Court found that it contained “no evidence that the
move to an inclusion classroom was likely to affect [J.R.’s] learning experience in any
‘significant way.’ . . .  The School District provided the same educational services to
[J.R.] on a daily basis, with the same special education teacher, but in a different room.” 
The District Court also accepted the sparse findings made during the administrative
proceedings.  Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the District Court’s findings
were not clearly erroneous and that it did not err in concluding that J.R.’s relocation did
not amount to a change in his educational placement within the meaning of the stay-put
provision.
J.R.’s parents assert that the District Court, in reaching its decision, misapplied the
modified de novo standard of review by according due weight to the hearing officer’s
decision instead of the appeals panel’s decision.  We disagree.  It is not at all clear that the
District Court deferred to the hearing officer’s findings to the exclusion of those of the
appeals panel.  The District Court explicitly stated that it had considered the decisions of
both the hearing officer and the appeals panel and that it was accepting the “factual
findings made during the state administrative proceedings,” not simply those of the
hearing officer.  Indeed, the District Court clearly viewed the appeals panel’s findings,
insofar as it made any, as compatible with those of the hearing officer, and we concur: 
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Nothing in the record indicates that the appeals panel had a view of the underlying facts,
or of the credibility of any witness, that differed in a significant way from that of the
hearing officer.  To the contrary, as the District Court noted, the appeals panel apparently
accepted the hearing officer’s findings but reached a different legal conclusion based on
those findings.  Nor is there any indication that the District Court took a significantly
different view of the underlying facts.  Inasmuch as the issue before the District Court
was one of law, it did not misapply the modified de novo standard of review.  Cf. Pardini
v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 192 n.13 (3d Cir. 2005) (Pardini I) (noting
that “the interpretation of § 1415(j) . . . is a purely legal one”); Drinker v. Colonial Sch.
Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 865 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the question of what constitutes a
student’s “current educational placement” is one of law).
B.  Attorney’s Fees
We turn next to the appeal at No. 07-2753, where J.R.’s parents challenge the
District Court’s decision denying their request for attorney’s fees in that case. 
Specifically, the parents contend that the settlement they reached with the School District
was sufficient to confer “prevailing party” status on them and that the District Court
abused its discretion in finding to the contrary.  We disagree.
The IDEA’s fee-shifting provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), provides in relevant
part that “the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.”  For purposes
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of the fee-shifting provision, “a plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his
claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.”  Clementon Bd. of
Educ., 442 F.3d at 855 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)
(“[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they
succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
parties sought in bringing suit.”).
J.R.’s parents cannot be considered prevailing parties at the district court level. 
After four years of federal litigation, they agreed to a settlement that did not provide them
with any relief beyond that which they had already achieved in the administrative
proceedings, abandoning “all other claims” raised in their complaint in doing so.  As the
District Court noted, J.R.’s parents “occup[ied] precisely the same legal position [after the
settlement] they were in when the case started.”  On these facts, we cannot say that the
settlement materially altered the legal relationship between the parties, either in a way that
directly benefits J.R.’s parents or otherwise, and we see no reason to disagree with the
District Court’s decision.
Moreover, the parents seemingly restrict their argument on appeal to the prevailing
party issue and do not acknowledge, much less attempt to justify or explain, Mr.
Lincoln’s failure to comply with the District Court’s order that he submit a revised fee
The parents raise two additional issues in this appeal, neither of which has any4
merit.  First, their contention that the District Court was required to obtain their consent
before referring nondispositive pretrial matters to a Magistrate Judge is contradicted by,
inter alia, our precedent interpreting the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636.  See,
e.g., Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The Magistrates
Act authorizes district courts to appoint magistrate judges to consider pretrial matters
without regard to the parties’ consent.”); In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“In general, a magistrate judge, without the consent of the parties, has the
power to enter orders which do not dispose of the case.”).  Second, we reject the notion
that the District Court somehow “abused” Mr. Lincoln by ostensibly making certain
negative remarks about him or otherwise.  We note that Mr. Lincoln apparently makes
these spurious (and somewhat incoherent) allegations on his own behalf; he does not
argue any prejudice to his client, only an affront to his personal sensibilities.  In any
event, on the record before us Mr. Lincoln’s accusations provide no basis for appellate
intervention.  Cf. Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1047 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[A]ppellate courts
review orders and judgments, not judge[s’] statements.”).
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petition.  To the extent they nonetheless intend to challenge the District Court’s ruling
that they failed to meet their burden to submit sufficient evidence “to demonstrate which
legal services are compensable for the . . . issues on which they prevailed” at the
administrative level, we find no abuse of discretion.  See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433
(“Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the
award accordingly.”); Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that a district court “should reduce the hours claimed by the number of hours . . .
for which the fee petition inadequately documents the hours claimed”); Rode, 892 F.2d at
1190 (“A fee petition is required to be specific enough to allow the district court to
determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).4
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IV.  CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of May 4,
2007, in the case at Docket No. 07-2440, and its order of June 5, 2007, in the case at
Docket No. 07-2753.
